The Global Emerging Robotics Market
報告摘要
Emerging robotics comprises the classes of machine that break the founding assumptions of classical industrial robotics — operating outside cages, in unstructured environments, alongside people, or beyond the reach of a reliable communications link — and that consequently depend on perception, learning and onboard decision-making rather than on a pre-programmed path in a controlled cell. Emerging robotics is the fastest-growing segment of the global automation economy and the most widely misunderstood. The market spans seven verticals: warehouse and logistics, defence, humanoids, manufacturing and automation, construction and infrastructure, space, and robotics foundation models. Three structural facts define the decade ahead, and each cuts against the prevailing narrative.
The first is that no general-purpose robot exists. Every commercially deployed system in the world today is task-scripted, teleoperated, or supervised. The most-cited humanoid deployments on earth — at BYD, GXO, Amazon, BMW and Mercedes — amount, in total, to a few hundred machines. The growth is real; general autonomy is not. And the systems operating closest to genuine mission-level autonomy are found not in humanoids but in defence, where GPS-denied and communications-denied conditions have forced the problem to be solved rather than deferred.
The second is that value does not sit where capital is flowing. Actuation — actuators together with dexterous hands, which are themselves actuator assemblies — constitutes the overwhelming majority of a humanoid robot's bill of materials. Semiconductors are a small and shrinking fraction of it, and even the silicon aboard the machine is majority motor-control rather than AI compute. Chinese suppliers hold a decisive structural cost advantage in precisely the mechanical categories that dominate the machine, arising from end-to-end domestic supply chains and near-total control of rare-earth magnets. A Western strategy predicated on owning the intelligence layer is a strategy predicated on owning the smallest part of the robot.
The third is that the binding constraint is physical, not algorithmic. Power, memory and bandwidth — not model quality — determine what a robot can do away from a wall socket and a network connection. A full manipulation stack demands more memory than onboard accelerators can supply, and every watt spent on inference is a watt not spent on motion. The operational compute and memory layer that follows from this is the fastest-growing category in the components market, it has no incumbent, and it appears on no published market map.
The components layer is where the machine's cost actually lives, and it is the least funded part of the industry. That asymmetry is the central investment finding of this report.
The Global Emerging Robotics Market 2027–2037 is a comprehensive analysis of the seven verticals reshaping physical automation, the three-layer stack beneath them, and the capital being deployed against both. Published by Future Markets, Inc., the report combines a full quantitative forecast to 2037 with an unusually direct assessment of what these machines can and cannot presently do. The report introduces the Autonomy Dependency Scale (A0–A4), a classification applied consistently to every company profiled, distinguishing designed capability from observed operating class. It records, for the first time in a market study of this kind, that nothing in commercial deployment operates at A4, that the most autonomous systems on the market are in defence rather than humanoids, and that the gap between vendor claims and field performance is widest precisely where capital is most concentrated.
A detailed bill-of-materials analysis resolves the value-capture dispute that has dominated the sector's commentary. The report demonstrates that actuation accounts for 73% of a humanoid's cost, that semiconductors fall from 8% to 5%, and that cost share, margin and defensibility are three different things — with a 40–60% Chinese cost advantage in the categories that matter most. The forecast covers 2027–2037 across seven verticals, seven component categories, five business models and five regions, in base, conservative and optimistic scenarios, with a full sensitivity analysis identifying the consumer humanoid price threshold as the single largest variable in the market.
Contents:
Executive summary — key findings, the three structural claims, and what changed since 2026
Introduction and taxonomy — defining emerging robotics; the market map; the three-layer stack (components → platforms → intelligence)
The autonomy gap — the Autonomy Dependency Scale A0–A4; designed versus observed autonomy by vertical; the data scarcity problem; why defence leads
Value capture and the bill of materials — full BOM decomposition; the actuation share; the semiconductor share; cost share versus margin versus defensibility; the Chinese cost advantage quantified
Supply chain and components — actuators and transmissions; dexterous hands (deep dive: $629M → $19.9bn, 41.3% CAGR); sensors; power systems; edge silicon; rare-earth and battery concentration; operational compute and memory
Robotics foundation models — the merchant model market; the vertical-integration squeeze; the data problem; why the layer's share of value declines
Humanoids — the three-wave adoption model; shipments versus ASP; the deployment reality check; concentration and the relocation of the market to China
Warehouse and logistics — sub-segments; the pick-rate frontier; cost per pick; the RaaS transition; why the humanoid loses here
Manufacturing and automation — the cell cost stack; batch-size economics; the skilled-trade shortage; the programming-cost curve
Defence — attritable mass; designed versus observed autonomy in Ukraine; the power budget; counter-UAS economics; autonomy licensing
Space — light-time delay and the collapse of teleoperation; the radiation-hardened compute gap; on-orbit servicing, ISAM and debris removal
Construction and infrastructure — the fifty-year productivity divergence; the automation frontier; why solar is the wedge
Market forecasts 2027–2037 — by vertical, component, business model, region and units; three scenarios; sensitivity analysis; the double-counting convention
Investment and competitive landscape — VC trajectory; capital allocation versus revenue opportunity; the starved components layer; exit environment
Company profiles — 168 companies with autonomy classification. Companies Profiled include 1X Technologies, ABB, Agibot, Agile Robots, Agility Robotics, AheadForm, AIRSKIN, AI² Robotics (AI2), AmbiRobotics, Anduril Industries, ANYbotics, Apptronik, ARX Robotics, Aubo Robotics, Augmentus, Baidu, BHRIC (Beijing Humanoid Robot Innovation Center), Boardwalk Robotics, Boost Robotics, Booster Robotics, Boston Dynamics, BridgeDP Robotics, Bright Machines, BRINC, Built Robotics, BXI Robotics, Charge Robotics, ClearPath Robotics, ClearSpace, Clone Robotics, Cognibotics, Contoro Robotics, Cosmic Robotics, Covariant, Daimon Robotics, Dataa Robotics, Deep Robotics, DeepCloud AI, Dexory, Dexterity, Diligent Robotics, Dobot Robotics, Doosan Robotics, dRobotics, Dusty Robotics, Dyna Robotics, Electron Robots, Elephant Robotics, EngineAI, Epoch Robotics, Eureka Robotics, EX Robots, Exotec, Fanuc, FBR (Hadrian X), FDROBOT, FESTO, Field AI, Figure AI, Fluid Wire Robotics, Formant, Forterra, ForwardX, Foundation, Fourier Intelligence, Franka Emika, Galaxea AI, Galbot, Gecko Robotics, Ghost Robotics, GITAI, GrayMatter Robotics, Hadrian, HavocAI, HEBI Robotics, Honda, Humanoid, Hypercraft, Icarus Robotics, Inivation, IntBot, intuiCell, Jacobi Robotics and more
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目錄 Table of Contents
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19
1.1 The Market in Summary 19
1.2 Principal Findings 21
1.2.1 No General-Purpose Robot Exists, and None Is Close 21
1.2.2 The Most Autonomous Systems on the Market Map Are in Defence, Not in Humanoids 22
1.2.3 Is Value Concentrated in Actuation, and is the Concentration Structural 22
1.2.4 The Binding Constraint Is Physical, Not Algorithmic 23
1.3 Market Forecast Summary 24
1.4 Implications for Positioning 25
2 INTRODUCTION: MARKET DEFINITION, TAXONOMY AND THE EMERGING ROBOTICS STACK 26
2.1 Defining Emerging Robotics 26
2.2 The Commercial Consequence of the Definition 26
2.2.1 The Five Competing Business Models 27
2.3 The Seven-Vertical Taxonomy 27
2.3.1 Foundation Models as a Layer Rather Than a Vertical 28
2.3.2 Humanoids as a Form Factor Rather Than a Market 28
2.3.3 The Growing Primacy of Defence 29
2.4 The Emerging Robotics Stack 29
2.4.1 The Operational Compute and Memory Layer 30
2.4.2 The Physical Components Layer 30
2.5 Scope Exclusions 30
2.6 Methodology and Basis of Estimates 30
2.6.1 The Treatment of Pilots 30
2.6.2 The Treatment of Teleoperated Systems 31
2.6.3 The Treatment of Replacement Demand 31
3 THE AUTONOMY GAP: WHY NO GENERAL-PURPOSE ROBOT EXISTS 32
3.1 The Present State of General-Purpose Capability 32
3.2 The Four Senses of "Autonomous" 32
3.2.1 The Consequence of Definitional Slippage 32
3.3 Teleoperation as Data Supply 33
3.3.1 Teleoperation Within the Cost of Goods Sold 33
3.3.2 The Economics of the Pilot 33
3.3.3 The Step Function 33
3.4 The Autonomy Dependency Classification 33
3.4.1 Application Across the Market Map 34
3.4.2 The Primacy of Defence in Demonstrated Autonomy 35
3.4.3 The Constraint Is Not Model Quality 35
3.5 The Infrastructure Dependency Problem 35
3.5.1 Availability 35
3.5.2 The Onboard Memory Wall 36
3.5.3 Accountability and Operational Memory 36
3.6 The Counter-Argument 37
3.6.1 Improving Connectivity 37
3.6.2 The Trajectory of Onboard Silicon 37
3.6.3 An Institutional Answer to Accountability 37
3.6.4 Assessment 37
3.7 Consequences for the Forecast 38
3.7.1 Humanoids 38
3.7.2 Defence 38
3.7.3 Foundation Models 38
4 VALUE CAPTURE: BILL-OF-MATERIALS ECONOMICS 39
4.1 The Dispute 39
4.2 What the Bill of Materials Actually Shows 39
4.2.1 The Mechanical Dominance of Cost 39
4.2.2 The Concentration Is Structural, Not Transitional 40
4.2.3 Even the Silicon Is Mostly Actuation 41
4.3 The Error Common to Both Camps 42
4.3.1 Cost Share Is Not Margin Capture 42
4.3.2 Margin Capture Is Not Defensibility 43
4.4 Where the Defensible Positions Actually Lie 44
4.4.1 High-Performance Actuation, Not Actuation 44
4.4.2 Operational Compute and Memory 44
4.4.3 Integration, Which Nobody Is Arguing For 45
5 THE SUPPLY CHAIN AND COMPONENTS LAYER 46
5.1 The Layer the Market Map Omits 46
5.2 Actuators, Harmonic Drives and Transmissions 47
5.3 End Effectors and Dexterous Hands 47
5.3.1 The Dexterous Hand Market 48
5.3.2 Why Hands Cost What They Cost 49
5.3.3 Demand by Industry Application 49
5.3.4 The Dexterity-Price Frontier 51
5.3.5 Competitive Implications 52
5.4 Sensors and Perception 52
5.5 Power Systems and Operational Energy 53
5.5.1 Power as Product 53
5.6 Semiconductors and Edge Compute 53
5.6.1 The Memory Wall 54
5.6.2 The Power Budget Trap 54
5.7 Operational Memory and Verifiable Autonomy 56
5.7.1 The Requirement 56
5.7.2 The Market Position 56
5.7.3 The Bear Case 57
5.8 Geographic Concentration and Chokepoints 57
6 FOUNDATION MODELS AND ROBOT LEARNING 59
6.1 The Layer and Its Ambition 59
6.2 The Data Problem 59
6.2.1 The Consequence for the Business Model 60
6.2.2 Simulation as Partial Escape 60
6.3 The Vertical Integration Squeeze 61
6.4 The Inference Constraint 62
6.5 Competitive Landscape 62
7 HUMANOIDS 64
7.1 Market Overview 64
7.2 The Deployment Reality 64
7.3 The Three-Wave Structure 65
7.3.1 Wave 1: Industrial 66
7.3.2 Wave 2: Consumer and Developer 66
7.3.3 Wave 3: Medical and Assistive 67
7.4 The Capability Gap 67
7.4.1 The Manipulation Bottleneck 67
7.4.2 The Step Function 67
7.5 Competitive Structure 68
7.5.1 Why China Wins on the Current Cost Structure 68
8 WAREHOUSE AND LOGISTICS 71
8.1 Market Overview 71
8.2 The Task-Scripted Ceiling, and Why It Does Not Matter Here 72
8.3 The Economics: Cost Per Pick 72
8.4 What the Buyer Is Actually Buying 73
8.5 Business Model: The RaaS Transition 74
8.6 Competitive Landscape 75
9 MANUFACTURING AND AUTOMATION 76
9.1 Market Overview 76
9.2 The Real Cost of a Robot Is Not the Robot 77
9.3 The Batch-Size Window 78
9.4 The Labour Constraint Is Specific, Not General 79
9.5 Competitive Landscape 79
10 SPACE ROBOTICS 81
10.1 Market Overview 81
10.2 Why Space Cannot Cheat 81
10.3 The Radiation-Hardened Compute Gap 82
10.4 The Autonomy Reality 84
10.5 Competitive Landscape 84
11 CONSTRUCTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 86
11.1 Market Overview 86
11.2 Why Construction Resisted 87
11.2.1 The Site Is the Anti-Warehouse 87
11.2.2 The Buyer Cannot Fund It 87
11.2.3 The Labour Question Is Political 87
11.3 The Automation Frontier 87
11.4 Competitive Landscape 90
12 DEFENCE AND SECURITY 91
12.1 Market Overview 91
12.2 The Procurement Inversion 92
12.3 The Gap Between Designed and Observed Autonomy 93
12.4 The Domains 94
12.4.1 Ground 94
12.4.2 Air 95
12.4.3 Maritime 95
12.4.4 Counter-UAS 96
12.5 Company Landscape 96
13 COMPANY PROFILES 98 (168 company profiles)
14 REFERENCES 323
圖表清單 List of Tables & Figures
List of Tables
Table 1. Global emerging robotics market by vertical, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 24
Table 2. Classical versus emerging robotics: the four broken assumptions. 26
Table 3. The seven verticals of emerging robotics. 28
Table 4. The emerging robotics stack 29
Table 5. Four distinct claims advanced under a single word. 32
Table 6. The three questions, and the answers the bill of materials supplies. 45
Table 7. Global dexterous hand market forecast, 2027–2037. 48
Table 8. Dexterous hand requirements by industry application. 50
Table 9. Selected foundation-model and robot-learning companies. 62
Table 10. Leading humanoid manufacturers, 2027. 69
Table 11. Warehouse and logistics robotics: selected companies. 75
Table 12. Manufacturing and automation robotics: selected companies. 79
Table 13. Space robotics: selected companies. 84
Table 14. Construction and infrastructure robotics: selected companies. 90
Table 15. Defence and security robotics: selected companies. 96
List of Figures
Figure 1. The Emerging Robotics Market Map. 19
Figure 2. The global emerging robotics market by vertical, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 20
Figure 3. Vertical positioning: 2027 market size against 2027–2037 revenue CAGR, with bubble area proportional to 2037 revenue. 21
Figure 4. Humanoid bill-of-materials composition, 2027 and 2037, by share of total. 23
Figure 5. The Autonomy Dependency classification (A0 to A4) 34
Figure 6. Autonomy class attained by vertical, 2027: prevailing class of deployed systems versus best-in-class demonstrated. 35
Figure 7. The onboard memory wall: robotic workload memory demand against the capacity of onboard accelerators. 36
Figure 8. Humanoid bill-of-materials composition, 2027 and 2037, by share of total. 40
Figure 9. Component cost per robot, indexed to 2027, showing differential rates of decline. 41
Figure 10. Semiconductor content per humanoid robot: what the silicon in a robot actually is. 42
Figure 11. Cost share against estimated gross margin, by component category, 2027. 44
Figure 12. The components layer: total addressable market by category, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 46
Figure 13. Global dexterous hand market: unit shipments and revenue, 2027–2037. 48
Figure 14. Dexterous hand demand by industry application, 2027 and 2037. 50
Figure 15. The dexterity-price frontier: degrees of freedom required against price ceiling, by application, with bubble area proportional to 2037 demand share. 51
Figure 16. The power budget trap: operational runtime against onboard compute power draw, 2027 and 2037 battery packs. 55
Figure 17. Estimated Chinese share of global supply, by component category. 57
Figure 18. Training data availability by modality: the robot manipulation data deficit. 59
Figure 19. Foundation-model layer revenue by business model, 2027–2037. 61
Figure 20. Flagship commercial humanoid deployments: units in the field. 64
Figure 21. The humanoid market by adoption wave, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 65
Figure 22. Humanoid unit shipments against average selling price, 2027–2037. 66
Figure 23. Humanoid market concentration and Chinese share of unit volume, 2025–2037. 68
Figure 24. Warehouse and logistics robotics by sub-segment, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 71
Figure 25. The pick-rate frontier: sustained pick rate against fully-loaded cost per pick. 72
Figure 26. Warehouse robotics revenue by business model, 2027–2037. 74
Figure 27. Manufacturing and automation robotics by sub-segment, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 76
Figure 28. The fully-installed cost stack of one robotic work cell, 2027 and 2037. 77
Figure 29. Cost per part against batch size: the addressable window for flexible robotic automation. 78
Figure 30. Space robotics by segment, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 81
Figure 31. Round-trip command latency by destination, and the collapse of teleoperation. 82
Figure 32. Onboard AI compute: commercial edge silicon, radiation-hardened space-qualified silicon, and the requirement for autonomous rendezvous and in-space assembly. 83
Figure 33. Labour productivity, manufacturing against construction, indexed to 1970. 86
Figure 34. The construction automation frontier: task repeatability against site-to-site variability. 88
Figure 35. Construction and infrastructure robotics by segment, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 89
Figure 36. Defence robotics market by domain, 2027–2037 (US$ billion). 91
Figure 37. Estimated unit cost by platform, against the attritability threshold. 92
Figure 38. Designed autonomy class against the class observed in operational use. 93
Figure 39. NEO. 98
Figure 40. RAISE-A1. 100
Figure 41. Agibot product line-up. 101
Figure 42. Digit humanoid robot. 104
Figure 43. ANYbotics robot. 111
Figure 44. Apptronick Apollo. 112
Figure 45. Aubo Robotics - i series. 115
Figure 46. Alex. 120
Figure 47. BR002. 121
Figure 48. Atlas. 122
Figure 49. XR-4. 143
Figure 50. Deep Robotics all weather robot. 145
Figure 51. Mercury X1. 158
Figure 52. Prototype Ex-Robots humanoid robots. 163
Figure 53. Figure.ai humanoid robot. 172
Figure 54. Figure 02 humanoid robot. 172
Figure 55. GR-1. 180
Figure 56. Honda ASIMO. 194
Figure 57. HMND 01 Alpha. 195
Figure 58. IntuiCell quadruped robot. 201
Figure 59. Kaleido. 206
Figure 60. Forerunner. 207
Figure 61. Keyper. 210
Figure 62. KUKA - LBR iiwa series. 215
Figure 63. Kuafu. 216
Figure 64. CL-1. 220
Figure 65. MagicHand S01 230
Figure 66. Monumental construction robot. 235
Figure 67. Neura Robotics - Cognitive Cobots. 240
Figure 68. Omron - TM5-700 and TM5X-700. 248
Figure 69. Tora-One. 254
Figure 70. HUBO2. 259
Figure 71. XBot-L. 269
Figure 72. Sanctuary AI Phoenix. 277
Figure 73. Astribot S1. 285
Figure 74. Stäubli - TX2touch series. 286
Figure 75. Tesla Optimus Gen 2. 298
Figure 76. Toyota T-HR3 303
Figure 77. UBTECH Walker. 304
Figure 78. G1 foldable robot. 305
Figure 79. Unitree H1. 306
Figure 80. WANDA. 309
Figure 81. CyberOne. 316
Figure 82. PX5. 317
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